Abstract-Let be an elliptic curve over a finite field of elements, with gcd( 6) = 1, given by an affine Weierstraß equation. We use ( ) to denote the -component of a point = ( ( ) ( ))
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
M
ANY standard pseudorandom number generators based on finite fields and residue rings have proved to be insecure; see [1] - [5] , [9] , [15] - [17] , [22] , [24] , [25] . Partially motivated by this and partially because this is of intrinsic interest for elliptic curve cryptography, several constructions of pseudorandom generators from elliptic curves have been proposed; see [27] for a survey of these constructions and results.
In particular, several new pseudorandom generators from elliptic curves have recently been suggested by Jao, Jetchev, and Venkatesan [21] . We note that after the pioneering work of Kaliski [23] , there have been several other suggestions and approaches to extracting pseudorandomness from elliptic curves; see [6] , [8] , [10] - [14] , and [19] . The construction of [21] is based on several new ideas and, thus, giving a rigorous analysis of these constructions is the primary goal of this paper. Our second goal is to show how one of the most powerful number-theoretic techniques, exponential and character sums, can be used to address these and similar questions. Besides, we also obtain several results about the structure of division polynomials that are necessary for our principal results and which can be of independent interest. We show that these estimates immediately imply the statistical independence of bits extracted from the aforementioned generator and give a rigorous assurance of its quality.
Although we do not evaluate implicit constants in our estimates, they are all effective and can be easily evaluated. So our estimates can be used for concrete numerical estimates as well.
Finally, we note that although elliptic curves provide a very promising source of cryptographically secure bits, as the recent result of [18] shows, they also have to be used with great care.
B. Results
We fix a finite field of elements and an elliptic curve over given by an affine Weierstraß equation (1) with some , ; see [28] . We recall that the set of all points on forms an Abelian group, with the point at infinity as the neutral element, and we use to denote the group operation. . Note that the subgroups of cryptographic interest are usually chosen to be of a prime order, so the coprimality condition is always satisfied. In turn, in the case of prime , we derive from our bound on that for almost all points , strings of least significant bits of each component of the -dimensional points (2) are uniformly distributed (provided that is large enough). We note that instead of strings of most significant bits (as suggested in [21] ), we use least significant bits. This is because for some primes (for those which are very close to a power of 2), most significant bits of random residues modulo are biased, while least significant bits are always uniformly distributed. A step toward such a result is made in [21, Prop. 5.1], but it contains some parameters which are not explicitly estimated in [21] . (And as we just mentioned, it cannot work for most significant bits anyway.)
Throughout this paper, the implied constants in symbols " " and " " are absolute. (We recall that and are both equivalent to the inequality with some constant .)
II. PREPARATIONS
A. Backgrounds on Division Polynomials
For an integer , let be the th division polynomial of over given by (1); we refer to [28] We now define the rational functions (7) We need the following property of and , which can be of independent interest.
Lemma 4: If is an ordinary elliptic curve with
, then for all distinct positive integers and , neither nor is a square of a rational function in . Proof: From (4) and (6) 
B. Exponential Sums Along Elliptic Curves
We recall the following bound of character sums with a nontrivial additive character of , which is given in [26] .
Lemma 5: Fix integers
and fix with . Let be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over . Then, the following bound holds:
where is an arbitrary subgroup of of order so that
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Sums U(N)
Theorem 6: For a prime power with 1 and an ordinary elliptic curve given by (1) with , we have for every positive integer . Proof: Expanding the square and changing the order of summation, we obtain For , we estimate the inner sum over trivially as . Thus, the total contribution to from such terms is
If , as in [21, Sec. 4.2], we note that any appears as for some point exactly times, where and are as in (1) . Therefore, using (5), we derive where the polynomials and are given by (7) . Now, by Lemma 4, we see that the Weil bound applies to both sums (see [20, Theor. 11.23] ) and together with (4) leads to the estimate for . Thus, the total contribution to from such terms is (9) Combining (8) and (9), we finish the proof.
Clearly, Theorem 6 improves the trivial bound for with any fixed . This is well within the range of interest in [21] 
B. Sums
We note that an appropriate version of the results of this section holds for any (in fact, even without the condition ). However, to make our argument more transparent, we assume that is prime. It is exactly the case which is needed for our primary goal, which is studying the bit patterns of the vectors (2).
Theorem 7:
For a prime , an ordinary elliptic curve , and a subgroup of of order , uniformly over all nonzero vectors , we have for all positive integers and with 1. Proof: Squaring out, expanding and changing the order of summation, we obtain (10) where For choices of and with at least one value equal to 1, we estimate the inner sum trivially as . So the total contribution from such terms is (11) We say that the sequence of integers , is a product distinct with respect to if the vectors and are distinct at all positions for which . We see from Lemma 5 that if , is a product distinct with respect to , then the inner sum over in (10) is . Otherwise, we estimate this sum trivially as . The total contribution from these terms is (12) where is the number of sequences of integers , , which are not product distinct with respect to .
To estimate , we assume that . If all values of and all values of , but are fixed, then must satisfy the equation and, thus, can take, at most, one possible value. Since takes distinct values, the total contribution we obtain is . (The vector shows that this bound cannot be improved.) Substituting this bound in (12), we obtain (13) Combining (11) and (13), we conclude the proof.
C. Applications
We now address the question of [21] on the distribution of bits of the vectors (2) . Let now be prime. We assume that is represented by the elements of the set . For a point , positive integers , , , and bit strings of length each, we use to denote the number of times the least significant bits of the binary expansions of the components of the vectors (2) . Hence, the term can be omitted from the above bound, which concludes the proof.
We recall that in [21] , using the values has been suggested. Since cardinalities of elliptic curves of cryptographic interest are either prime or contain a very small smooth part (that is, a part composed out of small primes), it is natural to assume that the order of the largest subgroup of with satisfies . In fact, assuming only that for some fixed , we see that Theorem 8 is nontrivial provided , and asserts that for almost all points , strings of least significant bits of the vectors (2) are uniformly distributed. That is, for all choices of bit strings of length and for almost all points , the counting function is close to its expected value .
